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written. Therefore the conclusions of the Board exceed the bounds
of reasonableness.
The Board entered findings that are not supported by
substantial evidence with respect to Factors A, B, C, J and P. As
a

result

of

the unsubstantiated

unreasonable conclusions.

findings

the Board

came to

It is not a matter of reviewing two

reasonably conflicting views. It is a complete, or near complete,
lack of evidence that Board used to justify its conclusions. This
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness.
The Board went beyond its authority contained in the
remand order in changing its conclusions on Factors C, E, 0f S
and T.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE BOARD'S CONCLUSIONS ON FACTORS E, I, G, D,
Hf Q AND N ARE UNREASONABLE BECAUSE THE BOARD
FAILED TO FOLLOW THE ACT.
The

Respondent's

Brief

failed

to

address

Tasters'

arguments that the Board came to unreasonable conclusions regarding
Factors E, I, G, D and N of the Act and therefore came to unreasonable conclusions. The Board failed to properly apply the facts to
the Act and is not giving effect to the Legislative intent.

The

Board's conclusions should be reversed because they are unreasonable. Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 819
P.2d 361 (Utah App. 1991).
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The Board unreasonably changed its conclusion.

The

Board's First Decision concluded independent contractor status.
The Board's Second Decision concluded Factor E was "not helpful."
Both sides agree that the employee side of the factor was not met.
The Board should have concluded, as it did in its First Decision,
that the findings with respect to Factor E support a conclusion of
independent contractor status.
2.

Factor I. Factor I requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk, telephone
or other equipment or is physically within the employer's direction
and supervision."

Emphasis added.

The Legislature wrote

the Act.

The Respondent

attempting to re-write the Act when it states:

is

"The factor

requires an examination of whether the individual works at his or
her own place of business or at a place of business of the
employer."

Respondent's Brief p. 20. The Act does not require an

examination of whether a demonstrator has his
business."

"own place of

Clearly, the Act does not require an examination as

suggested by Respondent's Brief.
The Act requires the Board to determine whether the
worker uses their own office, desk, telephone or equipment.
Board

found demonstrators use their own equipment.

Therefore, the

independent

contractor

fulfilled.
42774
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side of the

The

R. 528.
factor is

It is clear that the demonstrators are not physically
within Tasters' physical supervision. R. 152, 192, 199. Therefore
it is not possible to find employee status.
The Board and the Respondent's Brief unreasonably applied
the Act.

The independent contractor side of Factor I was met and

the employee side was not. The only reasonable conclusion is that
Factor I indicates independent contractor status.
3.

Factor G.

Factor G requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual establishes his or her own time schedule or
does the employer set the time schedule."
It is undisputed by both parties that Tasters does not
set the time schedule. The Board made that finding. R. 525, 526.
Therefore, it is not possible to read the Act and conclude employee
status on Factor G. The employer side of Factor E was not met. No
reasonable person can find that Tasters does not set the time
schedule and conclude employee status.

The Board's conclusion is

an unreasonable application of the Act.
4.

Factors D, H, 0 and N.

Factors D (assignment) ,

H (full time) , Q (works for a number of firms) , and N (tools) were
unreasonably determined by the Board to have minimal significance.
The Board concluded Factor D minimally indicated independent contractor status. The independent contractor test is whether
the services may be assigned.

The Board reasonably found an

individual "may assign the services" but goes on to state that
42774

-5"

"they do so only rarely," to justify the conclusion of minimal
significance.

R. 554. Frequency is not the test. The demonstra-

tors, not Tasters, control the assignments. The Board's conclusion
that Factor D has minimal significance is an unreasonable application of the Act because the Board adds a new test to the Act.
The Board concluded Factor H had minimal significance.
Whether an individual is free to work when and for whom he chooses
is the independent contractor test written by the Legislature.
Whether or not full time is required is the employee's side of the
factor.

Independence

or control

are

the ultimate

tests

in

determining whether an individual is an independent contractor or
an employee. The only reasonable conclusion is that an individual
who is free to work when and for whom he or she chooses, as are the
demonstrators, indicates independent contractor status.

Giving

this factor minimum significance exceeds the bounds of reasonableness.
The Board concluded that Factor N supports independent
contractor status but only gave it minimal significance.

The

furnishing of tools is undeniably a strong factor showing independent contractor status.
Act.

In fact, it is the test written in the

The Board's conclusion

"that the tools are not a kind

associated with an independent venture" is not supported by any
evidence and is beyond what is stated in the Act. The Act does not
ask whether the tools are the kind associated with an independent
42774
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venture.

The demonstrators, not Tasters, provide the tools to

perform their job.
written.

The Board again failed to follow the Act as

The Board unreasonably determined the factor to have

minimal significance.
Factor Q was also found to have had minimal significance
showing independent contractor status. Whether an individual works
for a number of persons or firms at the same time or usually works
for only one employer is a strong test of independent contractor or
employee.

Employees generally only work for one employer.

The

demonstrators work for a number of persons or firms at the same
time.

Some demonstrators compete with Tasters.

It exceeds the

bounds of reasonableness to determine this factor to be of minimal
significance.
II.

THE BOARD ENTERED FINDINGS THAT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE
WHOLE RECORD OR COMPLETELY IGNORED UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD ON FACTORS A, B,
C, J AND P AND CAME TO UNREASONABLE CONCLUSIONS.
The Board must use the evidence in the proceeding to make

its Findings of Fact.

First National Bank v. County Board of

Equalizations. 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).
Although it is a "universally recognized rule that this Court must take
some recognizance of the expertise
of the agency in its particular
field and accordingly give it some
difference to its determination".
The Agency's decision must rest upon
42774
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some sound evidentiary basis, not a
creation of fiat.
Id. 1164. The Board made findings not supported by evidence in the
record.

The Respondents did not respond or its arguments fail as

described below.
1.

Factor A.

Factor A requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual works his or her own schedule or is
required to comply with another person's instructions about when,
where and how the work is to be performed."

Emphasis added.

The Respondent's Brief did not respond

to Tasters'

arguments. The Board and the Respondent's Brief rely on a document
entitled "Very Important Things to Remember." However, there is no
substantial evidence to support the Board's position regarding this
document.
The

Respondent's

document is a requirement.

Brief

attempts

to argue

that

the

However, Respondent does not have any

facts to support the argument.
The document was entered into evidence over Tasters'
objection for lack of foundation.

R. 141.

The Department after

offering the document into evidence did not ask questions about the
document. Tasters President, Cohn, testified that the document was
a suggestion sent to some demonstrators with questions.

R. 232.

The Department did not cross examine Cohn about her statement.
There is no testimony from any person that it is a requirement, as

42774
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the Act requires. There is no testimony that the document is given
to every demonstrator.

Further, the demonstrators themselves

testified they determine how the work is done.

R. 190.

The

demonstrators consider that they can work when and where they want
and are free to accept or decline work.

R. 144, 162, 171, 201,

204, 205.
The Board entered the Finding that "Tasters gives such
demonstrators two pages of written instructions governing the
performance of their duties . . ., " without any support in the
record.

Neither the First Decision, Second Decision nor the

Respondent's Brief relies on any facts cited to the record.

This

finding which is not supported by substantial evidence led the
Board to an unreasonable conclusion.

The only reasonable conclu-

sion is that Factor A supports the independent contractor status
because the demonstrators control their own schedule.
2.

Factor B. Factor B requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual uses his or her own methods and requires no
specific training from the purchaser, or is trained by an experienced employee working with him or her, is required to take
correspondence or other courses, attend meetings, and by other
methods indicates that the employer wants the services performed."
Emphasis added.
Respondent's Brief incorrectly quotes this factor causing
Respondent to come to an unreasonable conclusion. The Respondent's
42774
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Brief incorrectly substitutes the word "or" when the Act uses the
conjunctive word "and," to connect to the words "by other means
indicates

that

the

employer

Respondent's Brief p. 24.

wants

the

services

performed."

The Respondent's entire argument is

based upon the alternative use of the list of factors rather than
the all inclusive requirement of all of the factors as required by
the word "and".
The Board made a finding that meetings were not mandatory. The Board also found Tasters provided written instructions on
how the work was to be performed.
employee status.

R. 525.

The Board then found

The Board unreasonably failed to follow the Act

as written.
All the elements of the employee side of the factor have
not been met.

It is uncontroverted that the demonstrators are not

trained by an experienced employee working with him or her, R. 218;
that a demonstrator is not required to take correspondence or other
courses, R. 182# 218; and that a demonstrator is not required to
attend meetings.

R. 182, 218.

As the Act uses the conjunctive

word "and" on the employee side of the factor, the Board's finding,
that Tasters provides written instructions about how the work is to
be done, is irrelevant.

Further, that finding is not supported by

any substantial evidence in the record as argued under Factor A
above.

42774
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There is overwhelming evidence that the demonstrators use
their own methods and require no specific training to perform their
demonstrations. R. 101, 102, 148, 151, 152, 159, 185, 186, 190.
The Board made its conclusion based upon facts not in the
record.

The Board unreasonably applied the Act because all the

elements on the employee side of the factor are not present.

The

Board ignored substantial facts in the record. This factor clearly
shows independent contractor status because all the elements of the
independent contractor side of the factor have been met.
3.

Factor C. Factor C requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual's services are independent of the success
or continuation of a business or are merged into the business where
success and

continuation

of the business depends upon those

services and the employer coordinates work with work of others."
The Respondent's Brief suggests there is evidence in the
record to support the Board's conclusions concerning Factor C.
However, the Respondent's Brief fails to cite to the record.

The

First Decision found this factor to be "of little significance."
R. 429.

There is no evidence cited by the Board or the Respond-

ent's Brief to support the Second Decision of employee status. The
Board's conclusions in its First Decision that it is not "not
useful" is the only reasonable conclusion because there is no
evidence.

The conclusion of the Board in the Second Decision is

unreasonable because there is no evidence.
42774
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4.

Factor J.

Factor J requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual is free to perform services at his or her
own pace or perform services in the order of sequence set by the
employer."
The Respondent argues, without any support from the
record,

that

the

conclusion

on

pacing

demonstrators' own account of their jobs.

was

based

on

the

Respondent's Brief

p. 21.

The Respondent did not cite to the record nor did the

Board.

The account of a demonstrator's job concerning pacing was

clearly stated by a demonstrator, who said she set her own pace.
R. 205.

Cohn, similarly testified.

R. 224, 225.

Neither the

Board nor the Respondent's Brief offered any reference to the
record.

It is unreasonable for the Board and the Respondent's

Brief to ignore uncontradicted evidence in the record.
reasonable

conclusion

is

that

Factor

J

supports

The only

independent

contractor status.
5.

Factor P. Factor P requires the Board to determine

"whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss as a
result of services performed or cannot realize a profit or a loss
by making good or poor decisions."
The Respondent's Brief seems to agree with the Board's
First Decision that this factor is "of little significance."
argues that Tasters did not present

42774
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relevant evidence.

It
The

Respondent's Brief does not show that there is any evidence in the
record on the employee side of the factor.
Tasters argues in its Brief of Petitioner that the record
shows that demonstrators, nor Tasters, will pay for their own
damage or liability.

R. 194, 230, 234-243.

Tasters asserts this

factor indicates independent contractor status. A conclusion, as
in the Board's First Decision, that this factor is of little
significance can be justified.

A conclusion of employee status

cannot be justified by any reasonable analysis because there is no
evidence on the employee side of the factor.
III. THE BOARD WENT BEYOND ITS AUTHORITY IN CHANGING CONCLUSIONS AS FACTORS C, E, 0, M, S
AND T.
The Board was unreasonable in changing its conclusion on
Factors C, 0 and M that were found in the First Decision to be "not
significant."

The

Respondent's

Brief

argues

"those

shifts

occurred, as already pointed out in this Brief, not because the
Board of Review changed its mind with regard to particular factors,
but because when viewed individually instead of groups of factors,
the factors were given individual attention and accordingly their
appropriate significance."

Respondent's Brief p. 33, 34.

The

First Decision did give an individual determination to each of
those factors and surely followed the Act to "analyze all of the
factors" before it placed them in the group of "not significant."
In the First Decision the Board found Factors C, F, H, 0, P, Q and
42774
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R to be in the second group and stated "In conclusion, most factors
in this category are not significant in evaluating Tasters' control
over its demonstrators, except Factor R . . ."

R. 405.

Clearly,

the Board had given each of those factors individual attention in
its First Decision.

Changing Factors C, D, and M from "not"

helpful to employee status was not permitted under the remand
order. Additionally, the Board's conclusions in the First Decision
that Factor E, S and T support independent contractor status was
not permitted to be changed to "not helpful" or employee status in
the Second Decision.
Appeals'

The Board should have followed the Court of

decision and made subsidiary

findings

to the First

Decision "as to why some factors were insignificant and why other
factors were considered significant."

Tasters, R. 516.

CORRECTION TO BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
Page 17 of the Brief of Petitioners incorrectly stated
that the Board's Second Decision found Factors L, Q, D, H and N to
indicate employee status.

The Board found these factors to

indicate independent contractor status.
CONCLUSION
The Board failed to thoroughly read the Act as written by
the Legislature.
conclusions.

This caused the Board to come to incorrect

It is not a matter of interpreting the Act.

the Board's ignoring the Act as it is written.

It is

It exceeds the

bounds of a reasonableness for the Board not to apply the Act as
42774
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written. This Court should change the conclusions of the Board on
Factors E, G and I and conclude that the facts as found by the
Board

require a conclusion of independent

contractor status.

Further, those factors found to have minimal significance were not
determined to have minimal significance by authority granted by the
Act.

While the Act allows the evidence to be weighed it does not

allow the application of tests not in the Act.

The Factors as

written go to the very crux of the issue between independent
contractor

and

employee

and

deal

with

elements

of control.

Minimizing the significance of Factors D, H, N and Q is unreasonable.
The Board entered findings in Factors A, B, C, J and P
that were not supported by substantial evidence viewed in light of
the whole record. There is no evidence that: Tasters gave written
instructions concerning Factors A or B; that there is no pacing
involved in the work as in Factor J; and there is evidence to
decide Factors C and P as determined by the Board. Therefore, the
Board came to unreasonable conclusions on these Factors.
The Board committed error in changing its conclusions
from its First Decision. The Court of Appeals requested it to make
findings as to why some factors were insignificant and why others
were considered significant.

If the Board would have followed the

Court of Appeals decision and left its conclusions as in its First
Decision, finding six factors showing independent contractor status
42774
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and five factors showing employee status and nine factors as not
useful, the parties could have more clearly dealt with the issues.
The Board in changing its conclusions on 11 out of the 20 factors
unreasonably complicated this matter, and required Petitioner

to

write its briefs not knowing whether the First Decision or Second
Decision applied.

Petitioner was forced to analyze the findings

and conclusions from both decisions, which are inconsistent. This
Court could send this case back to the Board of Review to find why
the factors in the First Decision were considered significant or
not significant and compensate Petitioner with attorneys' fees for
the writing of these briefs.
The Respondent, with the exception of two findings, has
accepted 52 of the 54 proposed findings by Tasters.
should adopt those findings.

This Court

This Court should conclude that the

findings support a conclusion that Factors A, B, D, E, G, H, I, J,
L, N, P, Q, S and T indicate independent contractor status and that
Factors K and R show employee status and Factors C, F, M and 0 are
not useful. Petitioner requests that the Court find that the First
and Second Decisions of the Board exceeds the bounds of reasonableness, and hold that the only reasonable conclusion is that the
demonstrators are independent contractors.
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DATED this

t

day of April, 1993.

GARY E.^eCTORMAN
RICHARD m MARSH
of and 'for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
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1993.
Emma R. Thomas
Attorney for Respondent
Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 <
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